

Eagle Point and White City, Jackson County, Oregon

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NEAI Projects*

Eagle Point Projects				
Year	Applicant	Project	Funding Source**	Amount
1994	City of Eagle Point	Community Action Plan	Local Funds	\$5,000
			USFS-CA	\$20,000
1994		Water System Improvement Project	EDA –RDA Grant	\$2,618,000
			EDA-RDA Loan	\$1,700,000
1996			Wastewater Facilities Expansion	EDA –WW Grant
	EDA –WW Loan	\$550,000		
1999		Hwy 62 – Eagle Point – Upper Rogue River Tourist Information Center	USFS-CA	\$27,000
White City Projects				
1995	White City	White City Housing Rehabilitation	CDBG— HUD	\$300,000
1995			TA – White City Mill Work Company Retraining	USFS
Regional Projects				
1994	Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development, Inc.	Planning Grants	EDA	\$57,000
1994		Project Development – Technical Assistance	EDA	\$80,000
1994			Planning Supplement – Capacity Building	EDA
1994		Revolving Loan Fund	USDA-RBS	\$2,000,000
1995		NEAI Staff Capacity Grant – Jackson & Josephine Counties	EDA	\$94,000
1995		Revolving Loan Fund (grant)	USDA-RBS	\$115,000
1996		Revolving Loan Fund Supplement (loan)	USDA-RBS	\$1,500,000
1994		Eagle Point School District #9	Upper Rogue Education Consortium	EDA USFS-CA Local Funds

* Project funding reflects initial loan and grant totals. Final funding amounts may be different.

1. Key to Funding Sources: EDA-Economic Development Administration, HUD-CDBG = US Housing and Urban Development-Community Development Block Grant, USFS-CA = U.S.Forest Service-Community Assistance, RDA = Rural Development Administration, USDA-RBS = U.S.Department of Agriculture-Rural Business Service, BLM = Bureau of Land Management, USF&WS = U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service.

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Regional Projects (cont'd)				
Year	Applicant	Project	Funding Source	Amount
1994		JITW Contracts	BLM USFS	\$245,687 \$291,457
1994	Little Butte Creek Watershed Council	Little Butte Creek Riparian Restoration	USF&WS	\$47,500
1995		Little Butte Creek Riparian Enhancement	USF&WS	\$49,994
1998		Little Butte Creek Watershed Irrigation Diversion Structure	USF&WS	\$60,000
1994	Rogue Institute of Ecology & Economy	Special Forest Products Assessment – Technical Assistance	USFS-CA	\$165,473
1995		Hull Mt. Fire Restoration & Training	EPA	\$95,000
1996		Ecosystem Restoration of Late Successional Reserves/Forestry Workforce Assessment & Industry Development Strategy	USFS-CA	\$57,000
			USFS	\$37,000
1998	Building a Local Integrated Forest Products Sector Using a Consolidation/Sort Yard	USFS-CA	\$30,000	
1995	Rogue Community College/Rogue Institute of Ecology & Economy	Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program	USFS-CA	\$27,200

Background Context

Eagle Point and White City, in Jackson County, Oregon, are two communities that are located about three miles apart but which have quite different histories and characters. Eagle Point was settled in the middle of the nineteenth century and grew slowly and haphazardly from a small rural community based on agriculture and then timber, to a modern bedroom community about six miles north of Medford—the largest city in southwest Oregon (population 58,895). About two miles south of Eagle Point and three miles north of Medford, White City, on the other hand, was a planned community from the start. After the United States War Department closed down Camp White in 1946, which it had

built in 1942 as a training and, later, a prisoner-of-war camp during World War II, a local businessman developed the community as a labor supply base for the industrial park that he was developing across the highway.

Nevertheless, the two communities are inter-related due to proximity, some shared history, a school district that encompasses both communities,¹ and interconnected economic and social ties. Although White City appears to have a larger population than Eagle Point, if only the population within the White City Urban Containment District were considered, the two communities are relatively equal in size. That may change in the next few years

1. The only high school and middle school in Eagle Point School District #9 are in Eagle Point. Therefore, children from the communities in the Upper Rogue Valley that are encompassed by the district are bussed to Eagle Point once they finish elementary school.

if Eagle Point continues to grow at its current rate—more than twice as fast as the rest of the county (Table 1). As Table 1 indicates, White City has a higher percentage of minorities than the rest of the county. This may reflect its lower cost of living and, therefore, attraction to lower income families. Both communities faced failing infrastructures, poverty and unemployment, disintegrating housing, and

inadequate fire and police protection in the early 1990s. Both communities, however, accomplished remarkable turnarounds by the end of the decade partly due to timely availability of NEAI monies, but largely because of the efforts of small groups of concerned community members who used the funds wisely and who gained widespread support in both communities.

Table 1: Population*

	Eagle Point			White City Division			Jackson County		
Population	1990	2000	+59.5%	1990	2000	+23.4%	1990	2000	+23.8%
	3,008	4797		5891	7267		146,389	181,269	
Minorities	3.9%			11.5%			5.6%		

* Source: US Census Bureau

Historical Context

Native Americans and White Settlement

Prior to settlement by Euro-Americans, the Rogue River Valley was populated by Takelma Indians who hunted, fished, and gathered along the streams and in the mountains. Takelma territory encompassed most of Josephine and Jackson Counties with the exceptions of the Applegate River Valley and the northeastern (Molalla) and southeastern (Shasta) corners of Jackson County (Loy et al 1976:7). All came to be known as the Rogue Indians, however, due to their ongoing hostility to the ever-increasing encroachment of Euro-Americans on their lands.

The first known white man to visit the Rogue River Valley was Peter Skene Ogden, who came in 1827 on an exploring expedition for the Hudson’s Bay Company. Over the next 25 years, traders, cattle drovers, and some immigrants passed through. In 1846, the Jesse Applegate party followed the trail to the Rogue River and succeeded in opening southern Oregon, northern California, and the Klamath country for settlement (Heckert 1977:114, 132, 134).

When gold was discovered in 1851 at Big Bar on the Rogue River, near the present town of Gold Hill (Heckert 1977:149), and a rich strike was found on Jackson Creek in early 1852 (Beckham 1971:73), miners and other immigrants started to stay rather

than pass through. Jacksonville sprang up as a mining boomtown that year. Unscrupulous miners and bands of “volunteers” calling themselves the “exterminators” massacred Indians whenever they could. Typical of “exterminator” forays were the surprise attacks in 1855 on Chief Jim’s band at the mouth of Little Butte Creek and on Chief Jake’s band in Wasson Canyon off the North Fork of Little Butte Creek, killing mostly women, children, and older men (Hegne 1995).

What the miners’ and settlers’ battles with local Indians did not accomplish, their land use practices did. The Rogue Indian Wars that raged on and off between 1852 and 1856 made it impossible for Indians to gather and store supplies for the winters. Mining destroyed fish habitat and farming destroyed traditional gathering grounds, greatly reducing the remaining Indian food sources. By 1856, Indians who had not died from disease, hunger, and war were removed from the Rogue Valley to a tiny strip of land in Siletz (Heckert 1977:216) on the northern Oregon coast, an area completely alien to them. Hence, sustained contact between the Rogue Indians and the white settlers was hostile and short, lasting somewhat less than five years. Thereafter, the only encounters with Indians along Little Butte Creek consisted of annual visits to the Little Butte Creek Mill in Eagle Point by the Klamath Indians to buy flour.

Eagle Point

Jacksonville was founded and already a thriving mining town in 1852. The settlement of Eagle Point, about 12 miles north by northeast of Jacksonville, followed quickly. In 1853, three men took up 800 acres along Little Butte Creek, diverted the creek water, and cultivated crops and raised livestock to market in Jacksonville (Freeman 1994; Hegne 1990: 1; Krambeal 1979:79). Although the first three men did not stay, the settlement, first called Little Bute and then Little Butte, grew slowly and steadily. In 1856, a Jacob Hoffman turned a sawmill into a flouring mill and a trading post. In 1863, school was held on a regular basis, and, in 1872, a post office and a new flowering mill (the historic Little Butte Creek Mill) were built about a mile downstream from the original mill (Hegne 1990:6-9). In 1892, Little Butte was renamed Eagle Point (Hegne 1995) after the “majestic bald eagles that routinely roosted on the cliffs east of town.” By 1893, Eagle Point had two hotels, two stores, two blacksmiths, a shoe shop, a saloon, a school, and a church (Freeman 1994). The town was incorporated in 1910 (Krambeal 1979: 69), and a year later the Pacific and Eastern (P&E) Railroad was completed. The railroad ran through Eagle Point and hauled supplies and passengers to Butte Falls and wood, farm products, and passengers back to Medford and as far as San Francisco. When passenger revenues decreased with the coming of the automobile, the P&E train was turned into a logging train in 1920. The Medford Corporation (MEDCO) took over in 1935, extended the railroad beyond Butte Falls and built miles of railroad spurs into the forest. Like elsewhere in the West, with the advent of the logging truck, railroad logging was finally closed down in the area in 1962 (Hegne 1997: 13, 26 & 28).

Until the 1980s, growth was slow and steady with most people relying on the timber industry for their living, but Eagle Point did experience small “booms” with the building of the P&E Railroad in the early 1900s and Camp White in the mid-1940s. The building of Camp White provided jobs for Eagle Point residents and income for old and new businesses. People rented rooms to first the workers and then married soldiers, and some newcomers stayed

and married into the community. Eagle Point and the outlying area were used for maneuvers and war games, and when Camp White was dismantled in 1946, Eagle Point acquired sewer pipes, electrical wire, tools, and whole buildings for extremely low prices (Barrett 1990:3-11). One building is still being used as the gym for the middle school, and people are still living in some of the relocated officers’ homes.

Despite the building spurt caused by cheap materials, Eagle Point went into a decline after the closing of Camp White (Barrett 1990:12). In 1968, Highway 140 to Klamath Falls was rerouted to bypass Eagle Point and that, say residents, was “the death of Eagle Point.” The 1970s were marked by recessions and the 1980s by a precipitous decline in the timber industry. “It was dreadful,” said one Eagle Point resident. “Everybody logged,” but by the late 1970s and early 1980s “people were on welfare and were losing their homes.” When another Eagle Point resident moved back with his family in 1986, Eagle Point seemed full of poverty and rundown houses to him. When he started selling real estate, he quickly learned that “people in the valley considered Eagle Point the north side of White City”—a real insult at the time.

White City

White City is not an incorporated city but can be identified by a U.S. census tract (established in 1980) and has its own zip code. It is located on what used to be known as the Agate Desert along the Rogue River at the base of the Table Rocks between Antelope and Whetstone Creeks. Although not a true desert, the shallow, rocky soil and lack of water make it useful for little more than cattle grazing. Even the Indians apparently had little use for it. A Seattle family tried to turn it into a pear orchard in 1905, but the underlying hardpan made the ground impossible to irrigate (Love 1988:6). It was mostly a place that people passed through until Glen Jackson, a businessman from Medford, decided that the area could be put to good use.

In early 1940, anticipating American involvement in the war in Europe, the United States War Department began looking for locations to build nine training camps. Glen Jackson and A. Evans

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Reams, a Medford lawyer, were instrumental in the selection of the White City area for one of those training camps. The War Department announced its decision to locate a camp in Jackson County on May 18, 1941, construction began on February 28, 1942, and the camp was completed on December 15, 1942 in a record 10 months. The cantonment encompassed over 49,000 acres or 77 square miles. The camp included warehouses, a bank, mess halls, bowling alleys, stockades, sewage treatment plant, and a 1,400 bed hospital complex among dozens of other facilities designed to accommodate 1,700 officers and 35,000 enlisted men in 1,300 buildings. The camp employed 9,000 civilians, trained 200,000 men over the course of the war (Barrett 1990:2), and in 1944 became a Prisoner of War camp as 2,000 German POWs arrived from Rommel's North African Campaign (Cotton, n.d.).

When Camp White was dismantled in 1946, most of the land went back to the ranchers. The hospital complex remained as the Veterans Administration Domiciliary ("The Dom"), but a 1,300-acre core remained with miles of concrete roads and a sewer and water system. A group of Medford businessmen, again led by Glen Jackson, bought the site and turned it into an industrial complex. Jackson convinced Southern Pacific to put in a railroad line, and by offering streets, water and sewer, cheap rent, loans, and "no city taxes," he attracted seven mills to the site almost immediately. By 1961, White City boasted its own fire department and telephone exchange, five plywood mills, three lumber companies, two moulding plants, a paint factory, and several other businesses that provided some 1,600 full-time jobs (Medford Mail Tribune 1961). By 1965, about 45 firms were established on 400 acres in the industrial park (Medford Mail Tribune 1965), and by 1981, the park encompassed 1,000 acres and 79 industries and companies (Medford Mail Tribune 1981).

Jackson was not content to attract only businesses to the White City Industrial Park. He also wanted to provide a "built-in labor pool in the form of Oregon's first planned community," so he purchased the

property rights for some 7,000 acres and named it White City (Love 1988:10-11). In 1952, he started the White City Realty partnership (Medford Mail Tribune 1964) to serve as the umbrella under which White City would be developed. In 1961, Jackson's White City Realty began developing 100 acres on the east side of Highway 62, across from the industrial park, and called it Cascade Village. By the end of 1963, 57 houses had been erected, 46 of which had already been sold, mostly due to a massive promotional campaign. The realty built Cascade Shopping Center, a swimming pool for the exclusive use of White City residents, and provided other services. However, Cascade Village was geared to industry, not community, so White City Realty discouraged any attempts to incorporate White City. They did not want any "situation . . . that might give residents the power to restrict industry in any way." (Love 1988:11-12)

In the mid-1960s, Jackson sold his interest to a Portland firm, and with his departure "it seemed that his force had disappeared. Regardless of the fact that one goal had always been to make money, Jackson at least had a feeling for the community of White City." (Love 1988:12) After Jackson's departure, the community spirit began to decline, attempts to incorporate failed since services were already available, factory workers living in White City moved to other communities, membership and activity in civic organizations waned, and development continued in a haphazard way (Love 1988:12-13). Community services were few and outside of a few primary streets, most streets were dirt roads full of huge potholes and difficult to drive on.² According to Love (1988:13):

Some say . . . that the last decade [1980s] has been the most cruel to White City. The average income of its residents is significantly lower than the rest of the county. The population, while ballooning toward 5,000, is made up of more single-parent households, more transient families and more renters than other local communities. The crime rate in White City, according to the Jackson County Sheriff's Department, has grown to about twenty-five percent of the department's total. Half of the county's

2. The author inadvertently found herself on a part of Avenue A that had potholes so big that it took about five minutes of very careful and very slow driving to get off the avenue. There were so many that it was impossible to avoid them. Residents say that that was the condition most of the streets in town were.

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Avenue A in White City. The potholes here are not as bad as some areas. The street has been torn up and is being repaved.

domestic violence calls and a high percentage of drug offenses originate in White City, deputies say.

In those days, White City was known as “felon flats,” White “Trash” City, and “Ground Zero” in the valley. According to a Jackson County Commissioner, White City was “a frightening place to live.” The roads were so bad that the Postal Service refused to deliver the mail and the school buses could not drive on them. Kids had to walk to school, but even that was dangerous—even in the daytime. What many residents of the community wanted was a safe place for children. So, in 1989, they organized the White City Community Improvement Association (WCCIA) and took matters into their own hands. They had Jackson County declare White City a “blighted area” in order to set up an Urban Renewal Agency two years later.

Key Issues

People in southern Oregon were extremely dependent on the timber industry, so people in Eagle Point and White City were profoundly affected by its decline in the 1980s. Everyone from mill workers to loggers to truck drivers to Forest Service employees was affected. Poverty and unemployment rates were

high, community infrastructure was either inadequate or outright failing, homes were becoming dilapidated, social services were insufficient, tax bases were inadequate, and dispirited people felt little community pride.

Eagle Point

Besides declining timber income in the 1980s, commercial activity in Eagle Point dramatically declined after Highway 140 from Medford to Klamath Falls was rerouted to bypass Eagle Point in 1968. The loss of commercial activity forced residents to commute or move out of the area in order to secure alternative work. According to the Eagle Point Public Works Superintendent, the water system was unable to handle population growth, the roof of the largest reservoir was caving in, and 26 percent of the water was lost through leaky pipes. The wastewater system was “even worse” as raw sewage was discharged into Little Butte Creek two to three times per year. As the City Council approved a number of low-income housing projects and as the commercial sector shrunk and the industrial sector remained underdeveloped, the tax base was insufficient to support the social service needs of the residential sector of the City, disproportionately large compared to its commercial and industrial sectors. Eagle Point had more police, fire, and emergency calls than average for a city its size without the usual tax subsidy from a well-developed commercial and industrial sector. Finally, the city was broke and in debt, the City Council was facing recalls and unable to cooperate sufficiently to address the issues facing Eagle Point, and a series of City Administrators were unable to deal with these challenges.

In summary, key issues for the Eagle Point community in the 1980s were:

1. Failing water and sewer infrastructure that could not accommodate residential, business, or industrial growth.
2. A declining commercial sector.
3. Lack of jobs and poverty due to timber layoffs and a declining commercial sector.
4. Disproportionate low-income housing and dilapidating homes.

5. The City was broke and its leadership was unable to tackle the many challenges the City was facing.

White City

While White City was already integrated into the regional wastewater and water systems, water and sewer lines were failing and everyone east of 23rd Street was dependent on well water. With few exceptions, the roads were unpaved and full of potholes, there were no sidewalks or streetlights, a disproportionate number of mobile home parks tended to attract low income and transient residents, and the old Cascade Village homes built in the 1950s and 1960s were getting run down. According to one resident, if a person wanted to “move up” in White City, they had to “move out.” Even with the industrial park across the highway, people lacked jobs, local social services were unavailable to needy families, and crime was prevalent. Since White City was unincorporated, it also lacked the community organization and tax base to address these needs.

In summary, key issues for the White City community in the 1980s were:

1. Failed infrastructure including water and sewer lines, storm drainage system, streets, sidewalks, and lights.
2. Disproportionate low-income housing (especially mobile homes) and transiency.
3. Drugs, crime, and domestic abuse causing unsafe conditions for residents and children.
4. Poverty.
5. Dilapidated housing.
6. Lack of community organization.

Taking Action

In both communities, people and events coalesced to tackle these issues. People organized themselves, set goals, and developed strategic plans, so that by the time NEAI funds were available, both communities were ready and able to take advantage of them.

Eagle Point

By the early 1990s, the Eagle Point City Council had found a capable City Administrator, and a council person with considerable leadership skills was elected mayor. According to that mayor, the City Council developed into a group that worked together to set goals, to develop a vision, and to address the community’s planning, infrastructure, economic, and social needs in a fiscally responsible manner. By communicating straight-forwardly with people about the challenges facing the city, the Council gained the support of the Chamber of Commerce and other service organizations, and mutual support developed within and between the City Council, the City Administration, and the whole community. The later hiring of another highly capable and skilled City Administrator was another wise choice by the Council. Several Eagle Point residents indicated that this administrator has been a critical player in advancing and implementing the community vision.

First, Eagle Point used NEAI funds to have a community assessment conducted, the results of which were used to set goals and to develop a strategic plan. NEAI and other funds were then used to upgrade and expand the water and sewage systems and to link these systems to the regional systems—Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority and the Medford Water Commission. Finally, the city used NEAI funds to do an engineering study and architectural design for an information center and rest stop on Highway 62 through which it was hoped that tourists would be drawn off the highway and into Eagle Point.

White City

At the beginning of the 1990s, three concerned women—a long-time resident of White City, a former White City resident and upper Rogue River area newspaper publisher, and a county commissioner and former Eagle Point School District #9 board member—joined forces to address the many challenges of the community. Their teamwork catalyzed the organization of the White City Community Improvement Association in 1991 and the formation of the Urban Renewal Agency in 1993. Through the efforts of these two organizations, by the end of the decade the

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Bingo Hall in White City, Oregon

decline of White City during the 1970s and 1980s had turned around. In 2001, instead of “felon flats,” outsiders were calling White City a “miracle.”

The White City Community Improvement Association (WCCIA) started out small—doing community clean ups and “Pride” days. Then a bingo hall in the commercial area of White City was financed, and, after leasing for two years, the WCCIA bought the building. Now the bingo money “supports the whole community.” WCCIA maintains Burns Memorial Park; conducts the Retread Program that distributes shoes, socks, and other needed items to elementary school children; has supplied complete wardrobes, beds, and medicines for seniors; and has set up the Max Burns Memorial Scholarship, a community foundation that has sent five youths to college. The foundation is “a big item,” according to a WCCIA board member, “to make sure kids have a future.” They supported the library through Urban Renewal and now take care of the elementary school by funding the Junior Achievement Program, the art classes, and the sports program.

In 1991, the Jackson County Commissioners declared White City a “blighted area” in housing and infrastructure so that the Jackson County Urban Renewal Agency could be formed. The agency has been a boon for White City. An Urban Containment District Boundary was drawn that includes the residential and the industrial areas. The Agency is self-funded through tax increment funding; that is, while property tax percentage rates cannot go up in Oregon, as property values increase (increments),

total tax revenues increase. The taxes are sent to Jackson County, which returns them in their entirety to the Urban Renewal Agency, which invests the money in the community. This generates a positive feedback cycle for development; that is, when the Urban Renewal Agency improves the community infrastructure, rehabilitates the residential sector, attracts new industry, and helps to improve existing business facilities, the value of both residential and industrial property increases. Higher taxes can be collected on the higher property values, which are reinvested in the community and which again raises property values, taxes, and so on.

In the residential sector, the Urban Renewal Agency has purchased Burns Park, paved the roads, installed the storm drainage system, upgraded the water and sewer systems, built sidewalks, and constructed a new library. An integrated human services center was built, the Rogue Family Center, which includes the new Sheriff’s Department substation. Future plans are to install lighting on the residential streets and develop a White City Civic Center, which will include an amphitheater, baseball fields, basketball courts, a play area and town square, and a new fire station. The agency is now trying to persuade developers to build “stick” houses instead of mobile home parks and trying to upgrade the existing mobile home parks of which White City has a disproportional share.

In the industrial sector, the Agency has, according to the county commissioner, the best record in the county for attracting new industries to the area,

and, therefore, generating jobs for the Upper Rogue Valley and other Jackson County residents. The Board policy is to attract and/or keep any company that will pay family wage jobs (defined as 1.5 times the poverty level). All of the projects were listed and planned from the beginning, so now the Agency is “winding down” and not adding any new projects. It is the Board policy to “get out of business” by 2008—three years before the allotted 20-year life span is over (1991-2011).

Moneys from NEAI did not go through either WCCIA or the Urban Renewal Agency. NEAI provided one of three community block grants from HUD that was administered by the Housing Authority of Jackson County. The program makes interest-free loans available to home owners for upgrading their homes. A loan does not have to be paid until the owner sells or refinances the house. In 1996, 20 homes were upgraded. NEAI-funded revolving loans were allocated to several industries and the fire station in the industrial park through Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development, Inc. (SORED I), which indirectly benefited the residents of White City and, possibly, Eagle Point. Finally, NEAI funds through the Jobs-in-the-Woods Program and the Job Training Partnership Act for dislocated workers helped individuals from both communities.

The Community Economic Revitalization Team (CERT)

In 1986, Jackson and Josephine Counties agreed to be a “region” with 17 municipalities as members who named the organization Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development, Inc. (SORED I). SORED I was also the Economic Development District for the area. When, in 1988, the Oregon Economic Development Department (OEDD) introduced the Regional Strategies Program, SORED I provided the organizational structure through which the program was administered.

In the Regional Strategies Program, Oregon was organized into Regional Strategies Boards under the direction of the OEDD. Regional Strategies Boards represented one or more counties and were comprised of elected officials, industry members, and, sometimes, private non-profit organizations and

private citizens. The Program focus was on “Key Industries,” e.g., tourism, agriculture, etc., and the Regional Strategies Boards would select one or, at most, two key industries, and accept project proposals that fit the selected Key Industry. In some parts of the state, county commissioners would collect proposals from various organizations and submit them to the Board for prioritization, sometimes going through several rounds. In Jackson and Josephine Counties, SORED I facilitated the process. The prioritized proposals would then go to OEDD for another prioritization process. State lottery funds for the approved projects would then be distributed to SORED I to administer.

In 1996, the focus changed from key industries to distressed rural communities, and by 1998 the Regional Strategies approach had been replaced by the Regional Investment Program and Regional Investment Boards. Applicants go through a similar process, but now the Oregon Economic and Community Development Department (OECDD, formerly OEDD) arranges a “one-stop” meeting of all the potential state and federal funding agencies. If funds are available and a project “fits” the objectives of one or more agencies, one agency is designated the “lead” to work with the local project contact. An application to the appropriate agency is completed, and the lead agency coordinates with the other funding agencies for the project.

When the NEAI Program came into being, the Regional Strategies Board was already in place, so the Jackson and Josephine Boards of County Commissioners appointed it to prioritize the NEAI projects with SORED I again providing the administrative structure and technical assistance. The two-page project identification forms were submitted directly to SORED I from the municipal governments, private non-profits, and independent communities. The prioritization process was done locally and annually, differing the biannual Regional Strategies process. Also the state did not prioritize NEAI projects as it did Regional Strategies projects, but it did provide staffing and maintained a database. The two-page Project Identification forms could be submitted to both Regional Strategies and NEAI, and, thus, both processes tended to “get married and le-

verage each other.” The Regional Strategies Program changed to the Regional Investment Program in 1998, and the NEAI CERT process was adopted by OECD’s Needs and Issues Inventory Program.

In Eagle Point, projects were prioritized with the guidance of a community assessment that was, itself, NEAI funded. That assessment was used to develop community goals and a strategic plan,

which in turn guided the selection and projects for which to apply for funding. White City did not apply for NEAI funding, since the Urban Renewal Agency was mandated to be self-supporting through incremental taxation. Other agencies in the county, however, applied for NEAI funds through the CERT process that both directly and indirectly affected the community of White City.

NEAI Projects and Programs

Eagle Point

Community Assessment

In 1994, the City of Eagle Point was awarded \$20,000 from the US Forest Service—Community Assistance Program to do a community assessment. With an additional \$5,000 local match, the City contracted with the Rogue Valley Council of Governments (RVCOG) to conduct the assessment. RVCOG subcontracted the project to the Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy to assess the community and identify issues. The Rogue Institute hired an anthropologist to direct the project, and who, with his assistants, interviewed and/or led discussions at both formal and informal meetings with 328 Eagle Point residents.

The changes that people identified that were affecting the community were (1) a population increase, (2) more Hispanics, (3) more low income residents, (4) decline in the economic base due to the changing occupation structure from work in the timber industry to work in the service sector, (5) more high-needs children in the school, and (6) recent rural settlement by white-collar urbanites who do not have experience with the land. The primary issues identified by people were growth, infrastructure, fire and police protection, traffic, business development, kids’ needs, a community center and community recreation opportunities, and the housing mix (Preister 1995:8, 17-30).

The broad base of Eagle Point residents and the high attendance at formal meetings (150 people attended the Town Hall Meeting) insured that the community needs and issues were well represented. The City used the report as the basis upon which

to identify goals and to develop a strategic plan. By 2001, the community had an upgraded infrastructural system, a community center, an expanded police department and city hall, an engineering report for an information center/rest area on Highway 62, and plans for further development of the commercial and industrial sectors of which the infrastructure and information center projects were NEAI funded.

Infrastructure – Water and Sewer

The City of Eagle Point had been unable to invest in the infrastructure for decades because of the decline of the commercial sector in the 1960s after Highway 140 was rerouted, the poverty caused by the recessions of the 1970s, and the timber industry decline of the 1980s. When NEAI funds became available, the City applied for and received \$5,318,000 in grants and loans from the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in 1994 and 1996. With this money and by raising water-sewer bills and Service Development Charges (SDCs), Eagle Point was able to upgrade and expand both the water and wastewater systems.

Eagle Point has been part of the Medford Water Commission, the regional water system, since 1936. The old water pipes, for which the City was responsible, were made of asbestos-concrete and were leaky. About 26 percent of the water was lost through the old pipes, so the City replaced, upsized and upgraded the water mains. The old reservoirs were also too small and in poor condition. They were replaced with a large reservoir near downtown and a small one on Riley Road, which together have a total capacity of 3.8 million gallons. In addition, the City bought an

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old four-million gallon Camp White reservoir from the federal government, which will be relined, covered, and used for future expansion. The new system is estimated to have the capacity to serve 12,000-15,000 people in the future—over twice the City’s current population.

The old wastewater system was also under-capacity and failing, and the City was cited two to three times a year by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) for dumping raw sewage in Little Butte Creek. An engineering study in 1994 gave the City two options: (1) to upgrade or (2) to connect to the regional system operated by the Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority (BCVSA). BCVSA serves most of the highly urbanized areas of Jackson County with local sewage collection and a main interceptor. Municipalities can either operate their own treatment system or connect with the 4-6 foot mainline to the BCVSA interceptor for treatment and discharge. Eagle Point determined that it was more cost effective to connect to the BCVSA system than to upgrade their lagoon treatment system. Nevertheless, collector mains needed to be connected to the interceptor and a pump station built to pump the sewage to the White City connections.

There was overwhelming support from the community for both water and sewer system projects despite the fact that their monthly water and sewer bills went from \$25 to \$40 a month. When the City explained to residents the costs and how it had to be paid for, 78 percent of the voters approved the water system, and, one year later, 80 percent approved the sewer system improvements. The City raised its System Development Charges to developers until Eagle Point has the second highest System Development Charges in the county. The high charges do not seem to be slowing development.

Because the City developed widespread support for the infrastructure projects and took a financially sound and long-term approach, development of a championship golf course and 800-plus home golf community was envisioned. Eagle Point Golf Course opened in 1996 and stimulated residential growth that has snowballed. A drive around town indicates new homes going up everywhere. Two hundred homes were built last year, there is a better mix of housing

from low income to high value, and people are taking more pride in their home and town appearance. According to a city staff member, the “pride of ownership” is caused by not only the presence of a world class golf course but also by people “mowing lawns, trimming trees, getting rid of junk, and doing more for themselves than they did for decades.” The housing mix encouraged by the state has also contributed to community pride in Eagle Point with homes ranging in value from \$100,000 to \$500,000.

Harnish Information Center and Rest Area

In 1999, Eagle Point received \$27,000 from the U.S. Forest Service-Rural Community Assistance Program to have an engineering study and design done for a combination tourist information center and rest stop on Highway 62 and Royal Avenue. The site was once part of the old Harnish homestead. The Harnish family, early settlers in the area, donated the land to the county for a park and Eagle Point bought it from the county. The information center design resembles a barn, and there will be picnic tables, an interactive display, interpretive trails, and information from Upper Rogue recreation areas, Southern Oregon Tourism, and other organizations as well as a rest stop.

Although the Harnish Center is not yet built, it is the kingpin in Eagle Point’s economic development strategy. It is hoped that the Center will pull some of the hundreds of thousands of people visiting Crater Lake each year off the highway, down Royal Avenue, and into the commercial district. Pedestrian and bicycle paths are planned, not only along that stretch of Royal Avenue into Eagle Point, but eventually throughout the town to and around the golf course and the many woodland areas that are scattered throughout Eagle Point.

White City

Since White City is not an incorporated city and the Jackson County Urban Renewal Agency for the White City Urban Containment District is mandated to be self-sufficient through increment tax dollars, NEAI funds were not received directly. The \$300,000 Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) awarded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to the Housing Authority of

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Jackson County (HAJC) had a direct impact on the community, while the \$13,000 grant from the U.S. Forest Service to The Job Council for White City mill worker retraining affected workers throughout the area including some White City workers.

White City Housing Rehabilitation

The houses in the core of White City, or Cascade Village, were built from the 1950s to the 1970s and by the 1990s were in need of much repair. The NEAI grant in 1996 was one of three CDBG grants over a six-year period administered in White City. The program is a zero-percent-interest loan program designed to upgrade housing. The owners do not have to pay back the loans until their houses are either sold or re-financed. In 1996, the Housing Authority of Jackson County was allowed to spend \$15,000 per home. The money is spent to fix any health and safety issues in the house first, to upgrade the exterior of the house next, and, finally, to do the home interior. Although the data are not available for 1996, Sandy Cook, Housing Rehabilitation Program Manager for HAJC, said that 119 people applied and 78 homes actually had repairs done in 2001. HAJC also offered this program to Eagle Point recently, which plans to use the money for people who have not been able to afford to join the popular home rejuvenation activity.

White City Mill Worker Retraining

The Job Council is a quasi-governmental agency that has served Josephine and Jackson Counties for 25 years. The agency works with economic development districts, the Oregon Employment Department, the JOBS (Job Opportunities to Basic Skills) or the Welfare-to-Work program, and with other organizations to provide unemployed persons skills identification, job hunting and computer skills, and vocation assessment and training through the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) (and, since July 1, 2000, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA)). In both JTPA and WIA eligibility is determined by circumstances such as a company lay-off, not by income level, so there is universal access. JTPA money was used to help displaced timber workers during the late 1980s and 1990s because it happened that the decline of the timber industry was “the biggest

thing happening,” according to one Job Council staff person.

The \$13,000 NEAI grant awarded The Job Council was for evaluation, assessment, and case management, according to a staff person, which is why the grant money was so low. The Job Council only did that once. No one, however, can remember the mill from which workers were retrained except that, undoubtedly, the mill was located in the industrial park in White City and that some of the displaced workers were from White City. During the 1994-1996 grant period, The Job Council served 79 displaced workers from Josephine and Jackson Counties of which 83 percent were employed at an average of \$9.24 per hour upon termination. Approximately 43 percent of workers, or 33 to 34 individuals, were from Jackson County. The number from White City was not available.

Upper Rogue Valley Region

The Upper Rogue Valley Region is the area north of Medford that includes White City, Eagle Point, Shady Cove, Trail, Prospect, Butte Falls, and a few other small hamlets. Partially funded by NEAI monies, the Upper Rogue Education Consortium Project and Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development, Inc. programs for regional planning, capacity building, and revolving loans benefited the entire region.

Revolving Loan Funds

From 1994 to 1996, Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development, Inc. (SORED) received \$3,615,000 in NEAI grants and loans that were used for a revolving loan fund for businesses throughout Jackson and Josephine Counties. No Eagle Point businesses received loans, but four White City businesses—all located in the industrial park—received a total of \$505,230 from 1995 to 1996. SOREDI indicates that 30 jobs were saved and 28 jobs were created at a cost of \$8,711 per job in these four businesses.

Technical Assistance

SORED) was also awarded \$80,000 in 1995 from the EDA. With this money, SOREDI handled five small projects throughout the region, one of which was the White City substation of Jackson County Fire District #3. Funds were used to con-

duct a study about the potential for consolidation of the fire stations in Jackson County. As a result of the study, the fire stations did not consolidate.

Upper Rogue Education Consortium

The Upper Rogue Education Consortium was the brainchild of a Jackson County Commissioner and an Urban Renewal Agency staff person, and facilitated by a professor from Southern Oregon University (SOU). The NEAI funds were awarded to Eagle Point School District #9 and administered through SOREDI.

The project started out as a forum in which the county commissioner brought people together to talk about some kind of upper level education or technical school for residents of the Upper Rogue Valley. She drew in the President of Rogue Community College (RCC); a representative for the President of SOU; the Director of the Veterans Administration Domiciliary (The Dom) in White City; the Director of The Job Council; the Superintendent of Eagle Point School District #9; representatives of business and industry; and others for monthly meetings lasting from 1993 to 1996. The consortium was concerned about (1) strengthening economic opportunities in the area so that people would continue to stay in the area after high school as they had been able to when the timber industry was strong; and (2) providing a training and education delivery system for high school students and adults in the Upper Rogue Valley.

The consortium had meetings with industry people in order to learn what kinds of skills were needed, discussed training approaches and needs with the school system people, and worked with the Education Service District and the SOU/RCC Resource Center at the Medford Mall. At the same time, the Director of Veterans Association Domiciliary was interested in developing an occupational training program for veterans at The Dom and in housing Rogue Community College at The Dom to provide those services. At that time, RCC served Josephine County, so the Director of The Dom, the President of RCC, and the county commissioner strategized on how to expand RCC into Jackson County.

Results of three years of meetings were a teleconference with Korea (an opportunity for kids to get exposed to another culture) and the expansion of RCC

into Jackson County. RCC now not only has a large campus in downtown Medford, but it also occupies an entire building at The Dom to do workforce training and is planning to build a workforce training center. The expansion of RCC into Jackson County has had a significant effect on both counties, and now SOU is planning to expand into Josephine County on the RCC campus. The RCC Workforce Training Center at The Dom has been “a huge benefit to Upper Rogue people and the vets,” according to the county commissioner, especially the truck driving classes for displaced timber workers and the computer classes for veterans, who are often better suited for computer work than for jobs that involve a lot of interaction with other people.

Jobs-in-the-Woods

Jobs-in-the-Woods (JITW) funds in Jackson and Josephine Counties contributed to one of the largest, most complex, and best coordinated ecosystem workforce training programs in the state: the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program. Classroom training at Rogue Community College was coordinated field training projects in both Jackson and Josephine Counties. The field projects were funded by the JITW Program through the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and administered by the Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy out of Ashland.

In addition, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) funded three projects for the Little Butte Creek Watershed Council for five years. That program involved the contracted watershed coordinator, one JITW crew for the two fencing and planting projects, and a local contractor on the instream diversion project; all working on one watershed. This JITW crew was partially trained through the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program.

Little Butte Creek Watershed

The Little Butte Creek Watershed Council, Inc. started in 1992 as the Little Butte Creek Committee. It became a watershed council in 1993 and was formally recognized by the Jackson County Commissioners and the state's Strategic Watershed Management Group in 1994. When NEAI funds became available, the

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services (FWS) awarded the watershed council \$157,494 for three projects over a five-year period (1994-1998) on the South Fork of Little Butte Creek—Little Butte Creek Riparian Restoration, Little Butte Creek Riparian Enhancement, and Little Butte Creek Watershed Irrigation Diversion Structure—through the JITW program. FWS worked with multiple local, state, and federal agencies and organizations to provide restoration project funding and employment opportunities to restore habitat within the Little Butte Creek Watershed.

In the Little Butte Creek Watershed Riparian Restoration and Enhancement Projects (FY 1994 and 1995), the Little Butte Creek Watershed Council contacted landowners and planned, implemented, and coordinated the projects on the properties of five landowners. Over the two-year period, eight miles of riparian/livestock fencing were constructed, four livestock watering devices were installed, and over 10,000 conifer and hardwood trees were planted for stream-bank stabilization. Six workers were employed for 2,760 working days with average wage and benefits of \$17.00 per hour. One Anglo and four Latinos stayed with the project for both years. This crew designed cattle-crossing fencing that survived the 1997 flood and which now serves as a model for other cattle-crossing barriers. They also set up a corporation to do ecosystem restoration.

The irrigation project (1998-2001) involved taking down a multi-ton pushup dam and building a permanent concrete dam with fish screen on a local ranch. Because the project was difficult (the volume of water in the creek is higher in the summer than in winter), the rancher was unable to do it himself. There was insufficient JITW funds to hire an engineer, so the Bureau of Reclamation was persuaded to design the project out of the Boise and Medford offices as an in-kind match at no cost to the Council. A local company with local workers was then contracted to do the project.

Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Partnership Program

The Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Partnership in Josephine and Jackson Counties began in 1994 as a broad-based partnership that includ-

ed Rogue Community College, the Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy, the Rogue and Siskiyou National Forests, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Southern Oregon Women's Access to Credit, and, for the first couple of years, The Job Council. Supporting and participating in the partnership were the Little Butte Creek Watershed Council, Applegate Watershed Council, Upper Rogue Watershed Council, and Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development, Inc.

The Job Council and the State Employment Office would send qualified applicants to the program and the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Partnership Committee would interview and hire the applicants. Rogue Community College (RCC) and the Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy (the Rogue Institute) would then coordinate the program and guide the applicants through the combined classroom and field training. RCC staff developed and coordinated the classroom training, while the Rogue Institute coordinated the field training. The Forest Service and BLM would develop a variety of restoration and fencing projects, and then the Rogue Institute would implement those projects as field training applications for the JITW crews. A one-year Occupational Skills Training Certificate in Ecosystem Restoration and Management was offered, and 60 workers were trained over the five-year lifespan of the program (1995-1999).

The annual process went as follows:

1. The Forest Service and BLM receive their budgets in October.
2. The BLM and Forest Service then develop projects. Each year the partner agencies meet and strategize, trying to get a mix of projects so that the crews could be offered a broad mix of training opportunities.
3. The Committee, consisting of partners and supporters, would advertise for workers in February.
4. About 30 applicants are interviewed by the Committee and some of the returning crew members in March, and 12 persons per year are hired. In addition,

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- five to six workers from the previous year are brought back.
5. Training starts April 15 and extends through the end of November without a break.
 6. During the first week, crew members are trained in the classroom for credit without pay.
 7. Starting from the third week in April to the middle or end of November, crew members spend four days in the field and one day in the classroom per week with the exception of the end of August during fire season, when they most often do classwork.
 8. Part of the crew is laid off at the end of November. The rest stay through December.
 9. Those who want the Certificate must enroll in the Winter Quarter.

Ecosystem Workforce Training Partners

The Job Council

The Job Council, funded primarily through the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), was responsible for referring potential JITW crew members, purchasing curriculum from RCC, and tracking participants. This relationship did not last long primarily because JTPA required that participants be placed in permanent, full-time positions, and JITW positions were seasonal. In addition, The Job Council was not equipped to promote an emerging industry (ecosystem restoration) as RCC and the Rogue Institute were trying to do. All agreed that this aspect of the partnership was not a good fit, so it was terminated.

Forest Service and BLM

Most JITW funds were distributed through the Forest Service and the BLM. These agencies worked together very little because little BLM land abuts Forest Service land, coordinators' job descriptions were not equivalent, the authorities of the two agencies are different, and, finally, the Forest Service has been doing community work for sometime through the Rural Community Assistance Program whereas community work is relatively new for the BLM. Both

agencies used JITW funds to pay private contractors to do projects requiring large equipment (e.g., road building or removal and culvert removal and replacement) and worked with the Rogue Institute to do the smaller, labor-intensive projects. The BLM tended to save small pieces of the large projects and any leftover monies for the Rogue Institute, while the Forest Service developed projects specifically for the Rogue Institute and the JITW crews. Both agencies were also responsible for helping train the crews in the field. The partners would hold meetings with the crew members to talk about the projects during which they "learned a great deal" and which they "greatly valued."

Rogue Community College

Rogue Community College had a complex funding system for the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program. Some funding came directly through the JITW program, the Oregon Economic Development Department contributed some scholarship funds to help people attend all three quarters to obtain the Certificate, The Job Council paid for some of the curriculum, and some private funding was obtained.

The curriculum was quite ambitious as can be seen in Table 2 and included basic work skills; first aid and safety practices; forest practices such as mapping, forest ecology, geology, watersheds and hydrology, silviculture, survey techniques and other measuring systems; math; and contracting. Specialists from all over the area were brought in to teach specific courses, and classes were translated into Spanish—at first simultaneously but later serially. Latinos were encouraged to take English as a Second Language (ESL) and English/Spanish Literacy classes at the White City RCC Campus. The Program was especially valuable in that it provided people with access to education, relationships with key agencies, business skill development, and small business development resources. "It was," according to an RCC staff person, "the most comprehensive program in the region."

Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy

The Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy (the Rogue Institute) was formed in 1990 by rep-

Table 2. Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program: Occupational Skills Training Certificate in Ecosystem Restoration and Management Requirements

Field Competency Requirements	Field Skills <i>Rogue Institute of Ecology & Economy</i>	Classroom Training <i>Rogue Community College</i>
Forest & Natural Resources Safety	Safety hazard correction; equipment use & maintenance; OSHA guidelines; accident reporting; wilderness survival.	First Aid; Woodland Safety
Leadership, Employability, Communication, Human Relationship Skills	Teamwork; effective interactions; Initiative taking; problem solving.	Cooperative Work Experience
Survey, Inventory, & Measure Forest Resources	Use of basic land/water survey & sampling equipment; use of aerial photos, maps, etc. to lay out a project; data collection; simple analysis; assessment.	Forest Practices I & II
Scientific Application of Technical Timber Stand Management Principles	Understanding of general silvicultural systems & principles of stand management; suitable land-use objectives; knowledge of basic biology & ecology; understand basic environmental impacts.	Forest Practices I & II
Application/Knowledge of Restoration/Forest Management	Use of horticulture/landscape equipment; site preparation & reforestation techniques; understanding seed sources; stream restoration & erosion prevention techniques.	Forest Practices I & II
Ability to Apply Mathematics to Fieldwork	Collection, recording, & analysis of technical data.	Forest Practices II
Basic Contracting/Landowner Laws & Regulations		Entrepreneurship for Contractors; Basics of Assessment; Protocols for Species Exams, Vegetation Surveys, & Stand Exams; Introduction to GIS; Tree Planting Inspection; Application Basics; OSHA Safety Training.

representatives of a local mill workers' union and three environmental groups as a response to growing polarization between timber workers and environmentalists. From 1994-1999, the Rogue Institute conducted community assessments, explored the potential of manufacturing products from small-diameter wood removed during thinning projects, and ran the JITW field training program (Aldous 1999).

JITW funds were not only funneled through the Rogue Institute from the BLM and the Forest Service but were also awarded to the Rogue Institute directly. Working with Anglo and Latino crew members in the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program from all over the region, including White City and Eagle Point, the Rogue Institute conducted training projects throughout Jackson and Josephine Counties. Projects included thinning and fuel load reduction, fence construction, trail maintenance, erosion control, stand exams, riparian restoration and enhancement, and assessment techniques. Through these projects crew members learned orienteering (use of map and compass), equipment use and maintenance, safety practices, data gathering and analysis, and numerous other skills indicated in the table on the preceding page. The Rogue Institute may have been able to continue with foundation grants and other funding sources after NEAI funding ceased, but the organization collapsed in 1999.

End of the Ecosystem Training Partnership Program

JITW funding enabled the Forest Service and the BLM to do projects that would otherwise be unaffordable. When NEAI support ceased, the agencies could no longer carry on the program as they had before. As ambitious and successful as the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program was, it ended for two primary reasons: JITW funding ended and the Rogue Institute folded.

The Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy played an important role in the Rogue Valley by developing collaborative relationships between otherwise opposing camps such as environmentalists and timber workers; doing indepth community assessments; and developing markets for small-diameter trees and special forest products (SFP) such as mushrooms. No one knows exactly what happened or who

was responsible and there are multiple and contradicting explanations, but in 1999 the Rogue Institute suddenly found itself hundreds of thousands of dollars in the hole. Consequently, the organization collapsed taking its programs with it—a “heart-breaking” process for many people. The result is that records are either widely scattered or missing; people who played significant roles in the organization have left the area for other jobs and cannot be reached; and there is a vacuum in services that the Rogue Institute once provided.

Workers

Sixty persons from both Jackson and Josephine Counties completed the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program learning both ecosystem restoration and business skills. Five persons, one Anglo and four Latinos, were on the Little Butte Creek Riparian Restoration and Enhancement project. Of the only two teams trained by the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program in the first year, the Little Butte Creek crew did not finish the first training. However, the crew stayed for both years (1994 and 1995). All other JITW workers were hired and coordinated through the Rogue Institute, which received project grants from the BLM and the Forest Service.

Crew members participated in the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program from one to three years, but confidentiality issues, lack of long-term tracking procedures, the demise of the Rogue Institute, unavailability of some of the key program leaders, and the inability to remember after the lapse of so many years made it extremely difficult to discover what happened to the workers. According to an RCC staff person, most of the Latinos got contracting licenses and most of the Anglos were hired by federal agencies. However, neither the Forest Service nor the BLM JITW coordinator indicated that ex-JITW crewmembers had been hired by those agencies, and, according to the BLM JITW Coordinator, it is difficult to employ local people for a wide variety of small tasks without JITW funding.

The Forest Service intentionally recruited Hispanics despite the considerable increased costs of translating curriculum into Spanish and providing interpreters. Despite these efforts, the language

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issue was a contributing factor in some of the misunderstandings described by four Latino JITW crewmembers. One was a crew member the first year (1995) but then returned as a crew boss for the next three years (1996-1998). Two other Latinos were in the JITW program in 1996, and one was on the Little Butte Creek Riparian projects for two years and was a co-founder of the contracting corporation. Three were from White City, one was from Phoenix, and all four had obtained their contractors license.

The first White City Latino took English and Ecosystem Training classes every Friday in the Program for the first couple of years. He did receive the Certificate but said that he learned nothing that he did not already know in the ecosystem classes. He did learn some useful skills from the Rogue Institute, however, the most important of which was the ability to speak in front of other people. His crews consisted of both Anglos and Latinos, and he earned \$12 an hour as a crew boss. While he felt that he worked “pretty good” with the Rogue Institute, contradicting orders from the Field Director and the Program Director confused him. He also feels betrayed by the Institute. According to him, the Program Director pushed him to get a contractors license in order to bid for a BLM job. After he spent \$6,000 getting the license and necessary tools, the Program Director told him that “this job’s not for you.” He bid for a couple of jobs after that but did not get them.

The second Latino from White City learned how to do stand exams, fish habitat improvement, mapping, and culvert removal and installation, and he does small, seasonal tree thinning jobs. But, he says, there is lots of competition, other contractors bid too low, and it’s hard to find work now. None of the three White City residents feel that they learned anything significant through the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program or that it helped them get regular work. The Phoenix resident agreed. RCC staff encouraged him to “make a company,” and he did. Since then, however, “there’s been no more help,” the contracting company he and his friends organized apparently no longer exists, and he is doing landscaping. The problem, he says, is the language.

For Latinos there is the language challenge, but for both Latinos and Anglos there is the problem of too few jobs for the skills that they learned. One Latino is gathering boughs for Christmas wreaths and doing other seasonal work; another does small thinning jobs and orchard work; another does orchard and other seasonal work; and the fourth is doing landscaping. The JITW Project Director for the Rogue Institute offered the Latino with the most JITW experience an ecosystem job in Klamath Falls, but that, he feels, is too far from home. There is clearly a need for the skills learned in the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program for watershed associations, on public lands, and on private lands. However, if and until funding is provided and an ecosystem “industry” is developed, workers are unlikely to find regular, albeit seasonal, work in the woods.

The nature of traditional contracting and procurement programs is another extremely important factor inhibiting the development of multi-skilled, local jobs for these workers to pursue. According to the Forest Service Partnerships Coordinator, the BLM, Forest Service, and State of Oregon all signed an agreement (Quality Jobs Initiative) saying that they would look at ways to increase the number and quality of local jobs, but it never really happened. Part of it may be due to decreases in agency funding and the fact that switching to different contracting methods was viewed as more expensive; part of it may be that many in the agencies find it difficult to change from the traditional contracting method for the most work at the cheapest rate (that is, they may not be able to see that they have a responsibility to the community as well as to the resource; and a large part of it is just the incredibly complicated and constrained contracting system that the agencies have and its inflexibility to do things in new ways. Although traditional contracting and procurement programs are changing, (e.g., Best Value Contracting that allows agencies to give a bidder more consideration if s/he shows how s/he will employ and/or train local people to fulfill the contract), the change is slow and possibly too late to help JITW workers funded under the NEAI Program.

Current Socioeconomic Conditions and Effects of NEAI on Community Well-Being

Socioeconomic Condition

The NEAI Program has helped to improve socioeconomic conditions in both Eagle Point and White City. In Eagle Point, grassroots participation in the Community Assessment provided the foundation for the development of the City’s strategic plan; the water and sewer infrastructure improvement was the basis for attracting the golf course, housing development, and for future residential, commercial, and industrial growth; and the engineering plans for the Harnish Information Center and Rest Stop may open the doors for future commercial and job growth. In White City, housing rehabilitation was one more piece in the overall strategy to improve livability in the community. In both communities there is palpable and, apparently,

growing community pride. In Eagle Point, one can see the vitality in the new housing development and in the neat older neighborhoods, and the White City transformation was described as “a miracle” by insiders and outsiders alike.

Figure 1 illustrates that the per capita income levels of Eagle Point and White City were 58 percent and 47 percent, respectively, of Jackson County in 1989. The growth of per capita personal income between 1990 and 1999 was 48 percent in the state and 43 percent in Jackson County. However, between 1989 and 2000, per capita person income increased by 55 percent in Eagle Point—a faster growth than either the state or the county.³ Only the 1989 data were available for White City.

Figure 1. Per Capita Income





Figure 2. Median Household Income




3. Ainoura Oussenbec, Workforce Analyst/Economist for the Oregon Department of Employment, Jackson and Josephine Counties, graciously e-mailed data from the Claritas, Inc. study of Eagle Point as well as from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

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Figure 2 illustrates median household incomes in the area from the available data. Median household incomes were 85 percent (Eagle Point) and 86 percent (White City) of the Jackson County median household income in 1989 (US Census Bureau). In the median household income category, however, growth in Eagle Point was 41 per cent between 1989 and 2000 (Claritas, Inc., n.d.), somewhat slower than median household income growth in Oregon (42 percent) but faster than in Jackson County (37 percent) between 1990 and 1999 (US Census Bureau). More recent White City data were not available. Figures 1 and 2 indicate increases in per capita personal income and median household

income in both the county and in Eagle Point that suggest that socio-economic conditions improved during the 1990s. On the other hand, the number of eligible students for the Free Lunch Program, an indicator of impoverishment, in the Eagle Point and White City elementary schools tended to grow during the early-to-mid-1990s, peaking from 1997 to 1998 and then declining (see Figure 3). Data from the 2001-2002 academic year (not included in Figure 3) suggest that an upward trend may be returning; that is, free lunch eligibility increased by two percent in the White City elementary schools and by eight percent in the Eagle Point elementary school.

Figure 3: Free Lunch Eligibility Rates



Crime in White City has declined since the County Sheriff's Department set up a substation and the community policing system was developed. In 1992, the county commissioner worked with the county sheriff to initiate a small storefront, community policing program using volunteers and existing deputies. In 1996, White City successfully passed an enhanced law enforcement district with a 64 percent

approval rate and the County Sheriff substation was set up. Table 3 indicates the success of that program and the reduction of crime from 25 percent of the county in 1988 (Love 1988:13) to less than 16 percent in 1999. Not only has the crime rate gone down, but, according to a staff person for the Fire District #3 substation in White City, domestic [abuse] calls are down.

Table 3. White City Crime Rate as a Percentage of Jackson County Crimes

Year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Percent	19.19	24.39	20.95	19.96	18.43	16.4	15.66

The changes in socioeconomic conditions have been largely positive. With incremental taxing, industrial development, and increased housing values, income streams have increased for the City of Eagle Point and the Urban Renewal Agency. Both have re-invested in their respective communities. Eagle Point is now fiscally sound, and the Urban Renewal Agency has been so successful in accomplishing their goals in White City that they will be able to “go out of business” three years ahead of the 20-year deadline.

In terms of quality of life, socioeconomic conditions have definitely improved in both communities. Both communities are more organized and cohesive, the appearance of both communities has improved, both communities are safer, and people in both communities feel an increased civic pride. Below are some comments made by people about their communities:

- “We have been blessed with wonderful neighbors.” A White City resident.
- “White City is the most miraculous thing in Jackson County.” A White City Fire District staff person.
- “People [in Eagle Point] are pro-community. They care about doing the right thing and are willing to suffer [for it].” An Eagle Point resident.
- “People in the community [White City] have been totally extraordinary. People came together and put heart and soul in it. I found out early that they had so much pride in their community despite its problems.” An Upper Rogue Valley resident.
- “People really care in this city.... These people are truly great people.” And because the city is now solvent, “we are able to help ourselves.... We won’t have to have a handout.” An Eagle Point resident.

Sound fiscal management, updated infrastructure, and improved environmental conditions (raw sewage is no longer dumped into the creek and the riparian zone of the watershed has improved) have all contributed to improved socioeconomic conditions and quality of life in Eagle Point and White City. But without the community spirit, pride, and collabora-

tion and without the leadership of a few dedicated individuals, none of that would have happened.

Community Capacity

Community capacity is the collective ability of residents in a community to respond to external and internal stresses, to create and take advantage of opportunities, and to meet local needs. Because both communities were or were becoming highly organized, had or were developing a well-developed process of community participation, and had or were developing long-term strategies for future economic development, they were able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the NEAI Program.

There are five dimensions of community: (1) physical capital, which includes a community physical infrastructure (e.g., sewer systems, business parks, capital assets such as equipment, housing stock and schools); (2) financial capital, which includes money, credit, and other financial resources available for local use; (3) human capital, which includes the skills, education, experiences and general abilities and capabilities of residents; (4) cultural capital, the myths, beliefs, norms, and lifeways that serve to organize groups and facilitate survival; and (5) social capital, which includes the willingness of residents to work together toward community goals (and not just self-interested goals).

Physical Capital

NEAI funds were a significant factor in the improvement of physical capital in Eagle Point and a considerably less significant, but still important, factor in improving physical capital in White City. The upgraded water and wastewater systems in Eagle Point not only attracted the golf course and enabled the construction of mixed housing units, it also provided the foundation for present and future residential, commercial and industrial growth. In addition, by stopping the dumping of raw sewage into the creek by a failing wastewater system and by improving the Little Butte Creek riparian zone, drinking water has improved, and the risk of flooding with its consequent damage to private property has been reduced.

The Urban Renewal Agency of Jackson County funded road paving, sidewalk construction, the Rogue Family Center, and a myriad of other

infrastructural improvements in White City with incremental tax funds. NEAI funds contributed to the rehabilitation of houses through a HUD Community Development Block Grant.

Financial Capital

NEAI funds also provided significant financial capital to both Eagle Point and White City. Eagle Point directly received well over \$5 million in NEAI funds to assess community needs, to upgrade its water and wastewater systems, and to design the Harnish Information Center and Rest Stop. Another \$157,494 was received by the Little Butte Creek Watershed Council to restore and enhance the riparian zone of the watershed, which benefits Eagle Point residents. Eighty percent of Eagle Point residents drive to jobs outside of Eagle Point (Martin 2000:13), but a commute to Medford is less than 10 miles, and money earned in Medford may well be spent in Eagle Point. Increased home construction and commercial development have and will generate local jobs, and, with residential, commercial, and industrial growth and its concomitant rise in property values, tax revenues, and therefore financial capital, will increase for the city.

White City gained financial capital not only through the \$300,000 CDBG grant to rehabilitate housing, but four businesses in the industrial park across the road received over half a million dollars in revolving loan funds. Of the 30 jobs saved and 28 jobs created through these loans, it is possible that some of those jobs are filled by White City residents. However, as the value of those businesses go up, so too do their taxes, and that directly injects financial capital into the community through the Urban Renewal Agency. It is likely, according to an Urban Renewal Agency staff person, that the community will vote for incorporation immediately after the Urban Renewal Agency ceases to exist so that White City can continue to receive those tax benefits.

The Upper Rogue Valley as a whole has gained financial capital from NEAI money. While White City businesses have received capital through SOREDI, other businesses in the area have access to the skills, loans, and technical assistance gained by SOREDI staff through NEAI funding. The formation of the Upper Rogue Education Consortium led directly to

the establishment of the Rogue Community College Workforce Training Center in White City, which has and will continue to help Eagle Point, White City, and other Upper Rogue Valley residents obtain jobs to support their families, to improve their homes, and to purchase goods in their communities. Finally, the Jobs-in-the-Woods Program provided jobs to both White City and Eagle Point residents for a time.

Human Capital

A number of White City and Eagle Point residents gained skills, education, experience, and general abilities and capabilities through NEAI projects. Despite the language barrier and lack of follow-up assistance, Latinos learned useful skills through the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program and projects funded by the Jobs-in-the-Woods Program as did the Anglos. Some gained English and entrepreneurial skills, and some Latinos and their children were inspired to go on to school to get a higher education.

The Rogue Community College Workforce Training Center in White City, inspired by the NEAI-funded Upper Rogue Education Consortium, has been a great opportunity for Upper Rogue Valley residents to improve their skills and experience in areas from truck driving to computer training. In the works is a plan to construct a new building on the Domiciliary grounds to house an expanded RCC Workforce Training Center.

Cultural Capital

Cultural capital includes the myths, beliefs, norms, and lifeways that serve to organize groups and facilitate survival. NEAI projects have helped to increase community spirit and pride in both communities, which has, in turn, led to increased social capital such as community organization and supportiveness. According to residents, both White City and Eagle Point have always been great communities. It is clear, however, that a few good leaders were able to rally their communities behind them and to develop the political structures (Eagle Point City Council and Urban Renewal Agency for White City) that would enable the communities to address some of their most pressing needs. If these leaders and communities had not already developed high levels of cultural capital

(attitudes toward and beliefs in their communities), it is doubtful that any amount of funding would have helped. On the other hand, as the ex-mayor claims, if NEAI funding had not been available, Eagle Point would have gotten money from somewhere else. Nevertheless, NEAI funding was available, the timing was right, and it did enhance the cultural capital of these two communities.

The initial use of NEAI funding to do a community assessment in Eagle Point was a wise move on the part of the City Council. By engaging people at the grassroots level and asking for their opinions, the Council not only learned what people's concerns were, but it also gained their support. The upgrading and expansion of the water and wastewater systems was not only overwhelmingly supported by people despite larger utility bills and higher taxes, but the projects also gave people visible benefits and encouragement. The City has made the residents part of the planning process, involving people in the decision-making, but the problem now, says the Eagle Point City Administrator, is that people are "too enthusiastic. People want to do too much too quickly, but it's still a matter of limited resources." In short, NEAI funds contributed to the cultural capital of Eagle Point by helping to improve attitudes and pride, which provide the foundation for social capital.

The housing rehabilitation accomplished in White City also contributed to community pride and supportiveness. Along with the streets and sidewalks, the improved housing was a visible accomplishment and source of pride. As in Eagle Point, however, it was the already highly developed cultural capital of community pride and cooperation that made that possible.

Social Capital

The existence of social capital, or the willingness of residents to work together toward community goals (and not just self-interested goals), is amply demonstrated in Eagle Point and in White City. As indicated above, Eagle Point residents were already beginning to work together when the NEAI-funded community assessment and infrastructural improvements helped to facilitate that collaboration and community spirit.

In White City, desperation and anger, provoked one long-time resident into doing something about

the conditions in and the bad reputation of White City. Between this resident, the newspaper publisher, and the county commissioner the White City Community Improvement Association was developed. This, in turn, led to the formation of the Urban Renewal Agency for the Urban Containment District of White City and the subsequent improvements in the roads, sidewalks, storm drainage system, and a myriad of other projects. NEAI money funded one of three equal grants through the Housing Authority of Jackson County to rehabilitate the older, dilapidating housing in Cascade Village. Thus, NEAI helped fund visible reminders that when people collaborate in the interests of the community, they get results.

To illustrate the extent to which social capital has developed in both Eagle Point and White City: Eagle Point recently supported a bond to annex into Fire District #3's service area, and Eagle Point and White City residents also recently approved a bond to build new schools throughout Eagle Point School District #9, which encompasses both communities. Both communities agreed to tax themselves. Eagle Point residents will experience a tax increase of 52.6 percent, and White City residents will experience an increase of 20.8 percent (Briskey 2001:2A).

Effects of NEAI on Workers

It is unfortunate that the demise of the Rogue Institute has precluded follow-up on most of the Jobs-in-the-Woods crew members. Had ecosystem restoration developed into a viable industry in a timely manner, many would have found work in that industry, although the complexity and rigidity of federal and state agencies' traditional contracting and procurement programs also militated against the using local ecosystem restoration workers. In addition, termination of NEAI funding meant that the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management had less money in their budgets to contract for ecosystem restoration. The JITW program and the RCC Ecosystem Workforce Development Certification program did increase workers' skills and, for some, provided a step up either for further education or for other types of jobs. Cessation of NEAI funding and the folding of the Rogue Institute, however, made impossible the follow-through that was necessary to

place people in more permanent jobs or careers, the effects of which were exacerbated by language barriers for Latino JITW crewmembers.

The Upper Rogue Education Consortium that founded the Rogue Community College Workforce Training Center in White City is an example of an NEAI project that did not directly benefit during the lifetime of the project, but which benefited workers throughout the Upper Rogue area now and which

will continue to benefit those workers in the future as the program expands.

It can be concluded then that the NEAI program had positive, but limited, impacts on workers. Had the funding continued, however, the positive impacts would have been far greater. With a longer time frame, RCC and other agencies may have been able to provide greater follow-through, guidance, and outreach to JITW workers, especially for Latinos.

Patterns and Themes of Successful Interventions

The primary pattern and theme in these case studies is that when people are organized, when they know and are committed to their communities' needs, when they communicate and trust one another enough to collaborate, and when government allows communities to set the direction rather than imposing restrictions, interventions are likely to succeed.

The pre-existing multiple, overlapping, and interlocking collaborative networks throughout Jackson and Josephine Counties enabled people to take advantage of NEAI funding in constructive ways and with far-reaching effects. SOREDI was not only able to provide revolving loan funding and technical assistance throughout the region, but partnered with numerous other agencies and municipalities to support other projects. Rogue Community College collaborated with the Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, Southern Oregon Women's Access to Credit, SOREDI, and four watershed councils to develop the Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Partnership. A Jackson County Commissioner developed a team that included the President of Rogue Community College, the Director of the Veterans Administration Domiciliary, the President of Southern Oregon University, representatives of industry and business, and others to develop the Upper Rogue Education Consortium, which became the RCC Workforce Training Center in White City. These collaborative efforts, facilitated by NEAI funding, benefited and continue to benefit people and communities in both counties.

In Eagle Point, a competent City Administrator, a mayor with leadership skills, and a supportive City Council went to their community members for identification of their needs and then developed a strategic plan on that grassroots base. NEAI funded the initial community assessment and the infrastructure projects that gave visible evidence that people's needs and goals were being met while setting the groundwork for controlled population, housing, and business growth. The interventions succeeded because of this community collaboration and leadership, but the NEAI funding and the timing of the funding were also critical factors.

White City is a living example of Margaret Mead's axiom to "never underestimate the power of a few concerned citizens to change the world." The efforts of a long-time White City resident, a newspaper woman, and a county commissioner led to the development of the White City Community Improvement Association and the Urban Renewal Agency for the White City Containment District. The White City Community Improvement Association was an integral part of, prime mover in, and, benefactor of the entire community through both the Bingo operation and the collaboration with the Urban Renewal Agency. The Urban Renewal District and the subsequent establishment of an Urban Containment District provided a tax base to support improved housing, streets, water and sewer system, storm water drainage system, better police protection, and improved family services through the Rogue Family Center. NEAI funding of one phase of housing rehabilitation through the Housing Authority of Jackson County

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was another contribution to the community. These projects are not only visible evidence of progress, but they also have had the effect of generating greater community pride and spirit.

Conclusions

The NEAI program and the projects discussed above in Eagle Point, White City, the Upper Rogue Valley, and Jackson County have been an unqualified success due to pre-existing collaborative networks, far-sighted leadership, and the timeliness of NEAI funding. The needs in Eagle Point and White City were great, goals were set within a grassroots community framework, and community-oriented NEAI funding helped to address those needs and meet those goals. Workers have greater access to job development resources now through the Rogue Community College Workforce Training Center that was initiated through the NEAI-funded Upper Rogue Education Consortium. NEAI also partially supported the ambitious and comprehensive Rogue Valley Ecosystem Workforce Training Program with Jobs-in-the-Woods funds. It is unfortunate that the demise of the Rogue Institute, the cessation of NEAI funding, and the national forces that have cut federal budgets have reduced the demand for an ecosystem restoration workforce, increased the supply of trained ecosystem workers, and precluded the follow-up, guidance, outreach, and organizational structure that could have meant viable jobs in the woods.

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Interviewees

Lu Anthony	Contracted Coordinator, Little Butte Creek Watershed Council and Eagle Point Resident
Judi Burns	Board Member, White City Community Improvement Association
Sandy Cook	Housing Rehabilitation Program Manager, Housing Authority of Jackson County & Eagle Point Resident
Jesus Deras	Crew Boss, Jobs in the Woods Program, and White City Resident
Tom Dew	Partnerships Coordinator, Rogue/Siskiyou National Forests
Dr. Richard Foertsch, PhD	Education & Training Consultant
Paul Galloway	Community Assistance Technician, Rogue National Forest
Geronimo Gonzales	Crew Member, Jobs in the Woods Program
Lou Gugliotta	Division Chief/Fire Marshall, Jackson County Fire District #3, White City
Ron Hodgen	Former Board Member of the Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy
David Hussell	Eagle Point City Manager
Hilario Ibarra	Crew Member, Jobs in the Woods Program and White City Resident
Bill Jones	Superintendent, Eagle Point School District #9
Al Koski	Economic Development Director, Josephine County Community and Economic Development Department
Sue Kupillas	Jackson County Commissioner
Nancy Leonard	Publisher of the Upper Rogue Independent newspaper and Eagle Point Resident
David McFall	Construction Projects Manager for Eagle Point School District #9, ex-Mayor and Resident of Eagle Point
Molly Owens-Stevenson	Coordinator, Ecosystem Workforce Training Project, Rogue Community College
Bambi Powers	Program Manager, The Job Council
Gordon Safley	Director, Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development, Inc. (SORED)
Zocimo Salas	Crew Member, Jobs in the Woods Program, and White City Resident
Gary Shipley	Eagle Point Public Works Superintendent
Cheryl Stout	Project Manager, Economic & Special Development, Jackson County Urban Renewal Agency, and White City Resident
Carl Tappert	Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority
Bob Walker	PE, Zone Engineer, BLM – Medford